Sharif Husayn ibn Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post-Ottoman Order: From Chieftaincy to Suzerainty

JOSHUA TEITELBAUM

In the latter years of the nineteenth and the first years of this century, Arab nationalists began to articulate their vision of a polity that would eventually replace the Ottoman framework. By the time Sharif Husayn ibn Ali al-Hashimi assumed the mantle of the Sharifate in Mecca in 1908, three ideas were in circulation which would have an impact on Husayn's vision of the post-Ottoman order. These were: the idea of a spiritual Sharifian or Arabian Caliphate; the importance of the Arabs, and of the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula in particular in an Islamic revival; and the important role the Hijaz should play in a post-Ottoman polity. While the polity that Husayn envisaged borrowed from previous formulations, it included ideas developed from his own experience as the leader of an Arabian chieftaincy. Husayn's vision was of a suzerainty, a *ri'asah*.

The notion of a Sharifian Caliphate in Mecca has roots that go back to at least the fifteenth century, and is not solely of European invention, as suggested or implied by several researchers. C. Snouck Hurgronje was probably the first scholar to assert so decisively that the idea had solely European roots. 'The idea of a Caliphate of the Shereefs of Mecca has been ventilated, more than once, by this or that European writer on Islam, but, in the Moslem world, it has never been broached, and no one of the Shereefs from the House of Katada – rulers in Mecca and in varying portions of West Africa ever since the year 1200 AD – ever thought of such a thing.'[1]

Recent research has demonstrated, however, that this is not true. Richard Mortel has shown that at least three Muslim historians from the fifteenth century mentioned the idea quite positively. Taqi al-Din Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Fasi, for example, a fifteenth-century historian of Mecca, wrote of Sharif Abu Numayy (r.1254–1301) that, 'were it not for his [Zaydi] madhhab, he would have been [a] suitable [choice] for the caliphate ...'[2]

The idea's trail can be picked up again in the nineteenth century, and earlier in that century than has previously been thought. Disappointed with

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Ottoman reforms, Muslims in northern Syria in 1858 were reported to support the establishment of a 'new Arabian state under the sovereignty of the Shereefs of Mecca'.[3] In 1860, the idea 'of using the Grand Sheriff as a kind of Caliph' to oppose the French in Egypt was discussed in British government circles.[4]

It would seem, then, that the idea was already about in the fifteenth century, and then revived, perhaps in only embryonic form, in the mid-nineteenth century. Martin Kramer picks up the story about ten years later in the historical record. The idea of a Sharifian Caliphate in Mecca began to be propagated in the late 1870s by John Louis Sabunji, G.C.M. Birdwood, James Zohrab and even Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani' al-Asadabadi, although by the latter a bit less enthusiastically. The most active on behalf of the idea – Muslim or European – was Wilfred Scawen Blunt, who was in contact with all the above.[5] Blunt espoused a solely spiritual Caliphate, not unlike the papacy.[6]

As we move forward in time, we also see evidence of movement in about 1880 in Bukhara among Muslims to establish a Muslim federation with the Sharif of Mecca as the Caliph,[7] and that towards the end of the century, the idea appeared to be quite widespread. British Muslim Marmaduke Pickthall noted that when in Syria in 1894–96 he heard 'Muslim Arabs talking more than once' about the Sharif of Mecca becoming 'the spiritual head of the reconstituted realm of El Islam, [and] the Khedive of Egypt the temporal head.'[8]

The idea of an Arabian/Sharifian Caliphate became more widely known in the Arab world with the serialization of 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakabi's (c. 1849–1902) book *Umm al-Qura* in Rashid Rida's *al-Manar*, April 1902–February 1903. This work purports to be the minutes of the meeting of a secret Muslim society in Mecca to work for a spiritual Qurayshi Caliphate to be headquartered in the holy city. The Caliph would have political power only in the Hijaz. The existence of the society and its goals were soon being repeated in diplomatic correspondence, and even made it into Negib Azoury's *Le Réveil de la nation arabe*. As Sylvia Haim demonstrates most convincingly, *Umm al-Qura* was taken from Blunt's *The Future of Islam*.[9]

Both Azoury and Rashid Rida advocated a spiritual Sharifian Caliphate in Mecca. Azoury, who published his book in 1905, suggested that an Arab sultan with political power would be headquartered in Mecca, while the Hijaz would be an independent state headed by the Caliph of all the Muslims.[10]

Rida elaborated on the idea of a spiritual Caliphate. In 1911 he founded a secret society called the Society of the Arab Association (*Jam'iyyat al-Jami'a al-'Arabiyyah*), whose aim was to unite the amirs of the Arabian Peninsula who would then join with the Arab provinces of the Ottoman

Empire. Sharif Abdallah, Husayn's son, passed through Egypt three years later, met Rida, and was inducted into the society. Rida proposed that Husayn be made president of a union of Arabian rulers, who would maintain independence internally but defend each other against foreign enemies.

In 1915, Rida gave the British a full explanation of his programme. Entitled 'The General Organic Law of the Arab Empire', it supported a spiritual Sharifian Caliphate in Mecca, with temporal rule to be held by a President and Council of Representatives to be headquartered in Damascus.[11]

It is clear that the idea was afoot.[12] But did the Hashemites know of the idea, and if so, what did they make of it? Our first piece of evidence comes from al-Afghani himself. Blunt wrote in 1885: 'Amongst other things, he [Afghani] told me that it was he himself who had suggested to the Sherif el Huseyn [Husayn ibn Muhammad ibn 'Awn] ... to claim the Caliphate, but El Huseyn had said it was impossible without armed support, and the Arabs could never unite except in the name of religion.'[13]

James Zohrab wrote home extensively, beginning in 1879, of rumours of the existence of a 'secret society' in Mecca whose objective was 'to restore the Khalifate to the Arabs of the Hedjaz.'[14] Zohrab was in the Hijaz during the tenure of Sharif Husayn ibn Muhammad ibn 'Awn (and into the second term of Sharif 'Abd al-Muttalib). It is not unreasonable to surmise that these ideas were already circulating in the Hijaz, and might even have been mentioned by Sharif Husayn ibn Muhammad himself.

The notion of a Sharifian Caliphate was also about in Syria in the early twentieth century. The US vice- and deputy consul-general in Beirut noted in December 1912: 'As long as the Sultan was also the Khalifa the religious bond that held the Kurds and Arabs to the Empire was strong; but with Abdul Hamid's deposition this bond was snapped; the only Khalifa recognized is the Sherif of Mecca ...'[15]

Kawakibi (and Blunt) were impressed by many supposed qualities of the Arabs of the Peninsula, such as their independence, their freedom from foreign rule and influence, and their knowledge of Islam and the observance of its precepts. Moreover, Kawakibi believed, they practiced equity and possessed a strong *esprit de corps*. The Arabian Peninsula itself was particularly well suited to be the headquarters of the Caliph, since it contained the Ka'bah, the Prophet's Mosque, and was centrally located for Muslims.[16] This argument in favour of the Arabs was to find an echo in the proclamations of Sharif Husayn's revolt and in the writing of Husayn's son, Abdallah.[17] Yet both of these elaborated on the idea by personalizing it. For they were not simply Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, and not simply Quraysh: they were of the house of the Prophet.[18]

All this suggests that upon assuming office, Sharif Husayn was most probably very well disposed toward the issue of a Sharifian Caliphate, spiritual or otherwise. The notion resided in the collective historical memory of the house of Hashim, where there were also feelings of primacy coming from Qurayshi lineage and being of the Prophet's family. The issue was also a topic of general discussion, most famously by al-Kawakibi. There was no reason, therefore, that an ambitious man such as Husayn would not have considered the possibilities, should they present themselves.

It will never be known for certain just when Husayn began to see the possibility of a Sharifian Caliphate as a realistic one. Although it appears that the *zeitgeist* gave ample reason for him to harbour such wishes, it seems that it was the British who gave him the idea that it might actually be attainable. Elie Kedourie and Ernest Dawn agree that in the initial contacts between Abdallah, Ronald Storrs (Oriental Secretary in Cairo) and Field Marshal Lord Kitchener (the British Agent in Cairo) in 1914, the Sharif was interested primarily in maintaining the Amirate of the Hijaz in his and his family's name. But upon the Ottomans' entry into the hostilities on 31 October 1914, Kitchener fired off a message to Abdallah in which he raised the issue of the Caliphate for the first time. Kitchener, it has been noted, 'had cherished for a long time the idea of an Arab Caliphate. ...' The message was sent (after embellishment by Storrs in Cairo) the next day, 1 November 1914. He asked for the help of the Arab nation, and added a key phrase: 'It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring.'[19] The effect on Husayn of such a statement by a man of Kitchener's stature must surely have been electric. These were heady words indeed.

While Hurgronje, Kedourie and Kramer have emphasized that the notion of a Sharifian Caliphate was a European invention and have implied that it was without Arab local validity, we have shown that the idea was actually local and quite old, and therefore most likely part of Husayn's primordial historical memory; it resonated for him. Kitchener's statement therefore did not fall on a *tabula rasa*, as far as Husayn was concerned.

After having read the text, Husayn told Storrs' messenger of his reluctance to revolt. The time was simply not right, said Husayn, but he was fomenting rebellion. He then discussed the Caliphate. He was cautious, but was considering the issue. He said, 'there no longer exists a Caliphate ... for their [the Ottomans'] rule projects ... deeds that are all contrary to religion. The Caliphate means this, that the rule of the book of God should be enforced, and this they do not do.'[20] Kedourie is right in pointing to Husayn's hesitation on the subject, for what he was considering had been talked about for years, but no real opportunity had yet presented itself.

Clearly, Husayn's interest in the Caliphate was high, but it was Abdallah who pushed things along. Kedourie sees Abdallah's hand behind the letter of 14 July 1915 which initiated what was to be known as the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. The letter demanded – apparently for the first time – that 'Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate for Islam.' Although Kitchener, in the 31 October 1914 message, had been vague and circumspect ('It may be ...'), it was most certainly tantalizing, and there was no reason for Husayn not to hope and believe that he was the object of Kitchener's statement. High Commissioner McMahon twice reiterated Kitchener's general comment in his letter to Husayn of 30 August 1915, and went even further to note that Britain would welcome the Caliphate's reversion to a 'true Arab born of the blessed stock of the Prophet', a certain reference to the Quraysh, and an implied reference to the Hashemites.[21] Kitchener was most probably talking about a spiritual Caliphate à la Blunt (a papacy of Islam), which was a popularly held Western notion, yet Husayn had no reason to believe that Kitchener and McMahon were referring to this type of Caliphate.[22] Although there is reason to believe that Husayn by this time was aware of the idea that there were those who conceived of the modern Caliphate as involving a separation of spiritual and temporal powers, Husayn did not subscribe to this notion. There is no reason to believe that Husayn had in mind any type of Caliphate other than the traditional Sunni type, involving temporal as well as a form of spiritual/religious authority or right to lead the *ummah* stemming from his being descended from the Quraysh and the Prophet.[23]

Husayn's ambitions and belief that he could achieve a grand role as a Muslim Arab leader and Caliph were nurtured by contacts with Arab nationalists as well. There is evidence of nascent Arab nationalist support for Husayn as early as 1911, when he received a letter of support for his activities against the Ottoman Vali from some Arab members of the Ottoman Parliament. These deputies gave him their blessing for the religious leadership (*ri'asah diniyyah*) of the Arab regions.[24] In that same year, Ali Rida al-Rikabi, the Ottoman Muhafiz of Medina, wrote to Istanbul complaining of Husayn's anti-Ottoman activities, and noted that he was assisted by 'the revolutionary Society of the Arab Revival' which aimed to set Husayn up as Caliph.[25]

The Arab nationalist societies of al-Fatat and al-'Ahd were active once the war began in recruiting the Hashemites to lead them. There were several approaches by the societies in 1915 both to Husayn in Mecca and to Faysal when he was in Damascus. These initial contacts led the Hashemites to believe that they had full Arab support. Husayn's ambitions were thus augmented, as was the possibility of implementing them. At a family

conference in Ta'if in June 1915, it was decided in principle to open a revolt and to begin negotiations with Britain.[26]

We should not close here without discussing actual Hashemite claims to the Caliphate prior to the Revolt. Given that the notion was about for hundreds of years, certain statements about the Caliphate by Husayn and Abdallah cited by Kedourie, yet attacked by Dawn as inconclusive, can now be given further weight, thus strengthening Kedourie's position that the Caliphate was a consuming desire for Husayn. In late December 1915 Husayn wrote to the Sudanese leader Ali al-Mirghani on the possibility of the former assuming the Caliphate:

> I had not claimed before to be the qualified chief of the Emirs (the Caliph) but I explained to them more than once that I was ready to extend my hand to any man who would come forward and take the rein of authority. I was, however, chosen in every quarter and even forced to take up the question of their future prospects.[27]

In a verbal message from Abdallah to McMahon, which accompanied the Sharif's letter of 18 February 1916, Abdallah requested 3,000 pounds sterling 'for myself and my scheme'; when queried, the messenger explained that Abdallah's scheme was to choose a 'powerful Islamic Committee from the Arab countries to offer his father the Khalifate. The latter is aware but feigns ignorance of these measures.' In a move that could have only greatly increased Husayn's hope of the Caliphate, Storrs sent the money along.[28] Our third example took place in October, a few months after the Revolt broke out. Abdallah asked Storrs nonchalantly during a meeting in Jeddah in October 1916 if he would address his father by the title *amir al-mu'minin*, a title most properly attached to the Caliph. Storrs knew this, and demurred, but it shows the direction of Abdallah's (and most probably Husayn's) thinking.[29]

Husayn's Caliphate and territorial ambitions were influenced, therefore, by three factors. First, there was the general idea – current in Muslim circles from at least the fifteenth century – that the Sharif of Mecca was the legitimate claimant to the Caliphate. Second, communications from both the British and Arab nationalists after he assumed the Sharifate in 1908 augmented his Caliphate ambitions and brought them into the realm of what he thought might actually be attainable. Third, the British and the Arab nationalists also influenced Husayn to believe that he had support for his ambition to achieve Hashemite territorial sovereignty over much of the Arab world. It may be assumed, therefore, that these elements combined to create in Husayn's mind a powerful mix of personal aspirations and the perceived ability to implement them.

Husayn aspired to the Caliphate in its traditional meaning, as a temporal

and spiritual office. As to borders, he wished to control the Arabian Peninsula, Syria and Iraq, but was probably willing to accept some modifications, and not receive everything at once. In his grand strategy the Revolt should lead to a fitting, Muslim replacement for the Ottoman Empire, and not simply a truncated Hijazi state controlled by a secular ruler. From the end of the war in the Hijaz until he declared himself Caliph in 1924, Husayn consistently maintained these aspirations.

The general lines of Husayn's vision were obvious to the British, and concerned them. A few weeks after the issuing of the Balfour Declaration in November 1917, High Commissioner Wingate noted in a worried tone that following conversations with Wilson, the British representative in the Hijaz, it was plainly 'evident that King Hussein has in no degree abated his original pretensions concerning Syria and apparently still nourishes illusion that through the good offices of His Majesty's Government he may be installed, at any rate nominally, as overlord of [a] greater part of the country.' Wingate concluded that it was worthwhile 'as an immediate opportunist policy' to 'encourage' Husayn's 'belief that an Arab State or Confederacy has been created of which he is Moslem overlord'; otherwise he might be driven to abdicate.[30]

Yet a month later, Kinahan Cornwallis of the Arab Bureau and Wilson had a series of conversations with Abdallah, and it is from these conversations that we receive the first inkling of some changes in Husayn's vision, probably as a result of British pressure to come to an accommodation with Ibn Saud, his realization that he could not control the Wahhabi movement, and the British refusal to support his ambitions in Syria and Iraq. In these conversations, he told Cornwallis that 'peace and unity could only be attained in Arabia by the grant of full internal independence to the different ruling chiefs, who in their turn must recognize the suzerainty of the King of the Arabs [Husayn]'. According to Cornwallis, Abdallah was willing to have his father be overlord over 'strong and friendly rulers', while Husayn, he suspected, 'would prefer a collection of puppet rulers with himself as the one strong man.'[31] Here, it seems, was the beginning of the policy which the British and Husayn were to call 'suzerainty', or '*ri'asah*.'

Abdallah also told Cornwallis to relay to Wingate confidentially that the real reason for his coming to Jeddah to meet him and Wilson was that he wanted to discuss proclaiming his father Caliph. As long as the Ottoman Sultan held the title, there could never be any real independence for the Arabs, he stressed; his father was the most fitting candidate, and Husayn's assumption of the office would bring Arab rulers over to his side. When Cornwallis pointed out that the King had said that he had no wish to become Caliph, Abdallah replied that this was customary – the decision had to be made for him by others.[32]

Worried about Husayn's possible reactions to the Balfour Declaration and the public revelation of the Sykes-Picot agreement by Jamal Pasha in a speech in Beirut in December, the British decided to send an emissary to the King in an attempt to clear things up. Jamal had branded Husayn as a traitor to Islam;[33] in Husayn's eyes, his salvation from such an accusation could only come about if he replaced the Sultan-Caliph temporally and spiritually.

Husayn had convinced himself that this was possible; as he saw it, the British would play along. Iraq would eventually be his, after a temporary British occupation, for which he would be compensated financially. Syria would be his too, as the French position in Syria would be like that of Britain in Iraq. In ten meetings with him in January 1918, Hogarth reported, 'the King barely touched on MESOPOTAMIA and neither said nor asked anything of importance about the future of either BAGHDAD or BASRA.' Husayn did not need to; he thought it would eventually be his. This belief was inadvertently encouraged by Hogarth, who 'was careful to let these questions...alone and he never seemed desirous of raising them.'

While Hogarth was sent to clear up the British policy to Husayn, what he told Husayn was so vague as to keep the King confident that he would eventually be granted his ambitions. Hogarth read him the Foreign Office formula later known as the 'Hogarth Message':

> ... the Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world. That this can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting, and that Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view.

The message also included assurances that the Muslim holy places in Palestine would have a 'special regime'. The first part of the message did little to dampen Husayn's ambitions; after all, wrote Hogarth, Husayn regarded Arab unity as 'synonymous with his own Kingship', and as 'a means to his personal aggrandizement'. 'Great Britain has planted a tree and it is natural that she will look after it until it grows and bears fruit,' wrote the King to the High Commissioner. As for the statement on Palestine, Husayn surely must have seen this as British deference to him as representing Muslims. Husayn believed that after the war he would receive what was due him. Hogarth inadvertently reinforced Husayn's misunderstanding of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence when he referred to the letters as actual 'Agreements' which 'safeguard[ed] the interests of our ALLIES and especially FRANCE'. Husayn laughed this off while making a reference to Fashoda in Sudan, where British and French troops had faced off in 1898 as England asserted its colonial interests in the upper Nile Valley.[34]

Hogarth was impressed with Husayn's determination that another Muslim power must replace the Ottoman Empire. Mecca had to lead, it could never take second place, Husayn had stressed to him. But Hogarth was quite aware of the difficulties of Husayn ruling other Arabs:

> He is born to rule, but, probably, not to rule much farther than his eyes can see. If he is ever to be King of an Arab Nation, that nation must be a federation of sovereign states with local autonomy so complete, that his shadowy suzerainty will stand simply for a symbol of unity and accord.[35]

The erroneous European conception of the Caliphate seems to be at the foundation of this assessment, allowing Hogarth practically to endorse such a 'suzerainty'.

From late December 1917 until well into 1919, most British officials connected with the Arab Bureau put forth the suzerainty idea, which had originated with Husayn. Wingate supported a British policy which would make the King '*primus inter pares* with the other Arabian Chiefs'. Clayton, for example, proposed a 'Suzerain authority' in which HMG 'would welcome King Hussein as Suzerain'. Hogarth, Wilson and Cornwallis issued similar endorsements.[36]

At a meeting of experts in Arab affairs in Cairo on 23 March 1918, it was generally agreed that no Arabs would accept Husayn as their 'temporal overlord'. Sir Percy Cox stated his agreement with the '*primus inter pares*' policy noted above. This was on the understanding that the policy referred to the religious and not the temporal supremacy of Husayn.[37] Clayton also began to see the wisdom of Husayn as a figurehead of 'a series of states loosely bound together in a confederation of which the King of the Hejaz would be the – at least nominal – head.'[38]

As Husayn began to recognize his limits towards the end of 1917, particularly his failure to get the British to recognize him as King of the Arabs and force other Arabs to accept him as such, he seems to have gradually dropped his insistence on this title, and developed the suzerainty policy.[39] On the face of it, Husayn's policy dovetailed with the above-mentioned British views, and he may have even been encouraged by them. While it was apparent that Husayn had in mind a much greater role for himself than that contemplated by the British, he may have hoped that the British could be brought around eventually to enforce his broader view of suzerainty.

Husayn had suffered his most serious setback in his struggle with Ibn Saud at Khurma in early June. In a series of conversations with British representatives, stretching from late May to November 1918, Husayn finally elaborated on his plan for suzerainty. As the Sharif saw it, this was his last chance.

As we have stressed, Husayn revolted against the established Islamic Ottoman order, and was wary of being accused of having brought about its breakup without a fitting substitute: 'As the OTTOMAN EMPIRE will be destroyed,' he told Wilson in June 1918, 'it is essential that there must be a large and independent MOSLEM GOVERNMENT in its place and a united ARABIA is the obvious Government indicated.'[40] He, as suzerain, would be the substitute.

He then went on to explain his plan. In the Arabian Peninsula, all the amirs would maintain rule in their families, and would appoint their own officials. Each amir would be given a *firman* 'saying that the rule of the country would be entirely in his hands as long as he continued his work properly; if he did badly he might be disposed ... Emirs would appoint Governors, inflict taxation, etc., without reference to the Overlord and in fact would have complete Home Rule.' None of them would pay tribute. The Suzerain would only interfere in the larger tribal matters. He gave two examples: If some Hijazis went to Najd and committed a crime, Husayn would ask Ibn Saud to swear a religious oath that it was so; the Hijaz government would pay the fine, and the Hijazis would be dealt with on their return to the Hijaz. If an entire town or tribe complained to the Suzerain, 'the latter would deal with the matter.' But the amirs would have to acknowledge him as their 'Overlord'. When Wilson reminded Husayn that HMG had treaties with the Idrisi and Ibn Saud, the King remarked that Britain only had to tell them to join the confederation, and they would. As for Syria and Iraq, where he acknowledged that he did not know the local customs, the people could form their own government and solve all local issues, but he would rule. Since the Arabian chiefs would pay no tribute, Syria and Iraq would provide income for the upkeep of the *Haramayn*. Wilson concluded as a result of these conversations that Husayn interpreted all the correspondence with HMG to mean that they accepted him as the Overlord. Moreover, Wilson was astonished that 'to our approval of an Arab Caliphate if one is set up the King attaches a far wider meaning than we ever intended, as he includes Temporal as well as Spiritual power in the term Caliphate.'[41]

Husayn was also concerned that the Hijaz would be impoverished if after the war – bereft of British and Ottoman subsidies – it would have to depend solely on the pilgrimage. Fu'ad al-Khatib, Husayn's Syrian adviser, wrote to Wilson that Husayn had begun to fear that

> he will only be in Hedjaz and that his state at that time will be very difficult because of the poverty of these towns which were unable to exist alone for one single day but were helped by the Turkish Empire (the owner of the Caliphate) for the sake of which Moslems were

> helping it with money. Now if the war were to be suppressed ... and his supplies (were) stopped ... all Moslems would become angry with him and if he received anything from a country not ... Mohammedan this will be more...difficult for him besides the loss of the future of his sons the like of whose love for His Highness I never saw nor have I ever seen a father with greater love for his sons.[42]

In a conversation with Wilson on 18 July 1918, Husayn told the British representative he considered England to have promised 'the revival of the ARAB CALIPHATE and a UNITED ARABIA under his (King HUSSEIN'S) suzerainty ('taht Riasaty' [*sic*])'. The borders included the whole of 'Geziret el Arab' with certain reservations concerning Basra and other regions bordering the Persian Gulf. Wilson asked Husayn what he meant by the term *Jazirat al-'Arab*; Husayn replied that the term was synonymous with *al-Bilad al-'Arabiyyah*, over which he had already declared himself King. He begged Wilson to give him an official assurance, privately, that at the peace conference Britain would adopt this policy; otherwise, he would not be able to go on.[43]

In November, well after his defeat at Khurma, Husayn further detailed his programme for suzerainty, in the form of a 12-point programme. The programme was couched mostly in terms of reference to Ibn Saud, but the principles were to hold also for other amirs. Husayn would rule a *markaz*, or central government; the amirs would be ruled by the Qur'an and the Sunna, along with the common law laid down by each amir; their powers were to be 'more than that of a vali and of a lesser degree to that of independent Emirs'. Most importantly

> the Emir of NEJD has got no right to negotiate with any other power regarding anything whatever because such rights [are]one of the prerogatives of the MERKAZ (Central Government) and (such matters) should be referred to it and should be done through it and must be approved by it.

Husayn noted further that Najd would have no representation abroad, and that the *markaz* would be responsible for the protection and the external affairs of Najd. As for tribal matters, in addition to dispersing the *ikhwan hujar* (settled communities of Wahhabi fighters), Husayn's scheme aimed at assuring tribal harmony by demanding that Ibn Saud give Hijazi tribes access to Najdi markets and pasture lands.[44]

What Husayn was describing was an expanded chieftaincy (sometimes called a chiefdom) encompassing all of the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula, with Husayn as chieftain; internal affairs would be delegated, but he would be the main ruler. Any 'independence' of the amirs was to be

quite limited. Husayn had established a smaller version of this in the Hijaz, and it was a similar polity to that of his Arabian Peninsula neighbours, Ibn Rashid of Jabal Shammar, the Idrisi of 'Asir, and Ibn Saud of Najd.

Joseph Kostiner writes that the chieftaincy was the predominant form of political organization in Arabia until the early twentieth century. It

> consisted of loose tribal alliances based on power sharing, mutual responsibilities and duty-sharing relationships among nomadic tribal groups, sedentarized inhabitants centered in villages and towns, and a ruler who governed these alliances. The ruler was a member of a leading family of a major tribe who had both the authority and the obligation to maintain internal order in the chieftaincy, to protect his people (*himaya*), and to wage war against enemies. Sometimes he had religious authority as well. The nomads received the benefit of urban facilities such as markets (*musabala*) and institutionalized religious rites. In return, they acknowledged the leaders' authority, pledged their allegiance to him, and sometimes even paid tribute (or protection money, *khuwwa*) to the ruler. The sedentarized population had to fight for the state, pay tribute to the ruler and sometimes to the regional nomadic tribe, and provide facilities for the nomads, in return for trade benefits and protection.[45]

Borders between chieftaincies were not sharply defined, but were rather a function of the *dirah*s, or respective grazing zones of the tribes. The administration of the chieftaincy was quite simple, if non-existent, with practically no bureaucracy. It followed that 'the authority structures of a chieftaincy's various sectors were not controlled by the ruler but retained autonomy in the conduct of their internal affairs.'[46] Loyalties in chieftaincies were personal and provisional, and thus inherently unstable; tribes came and left the polity. Social cohesion and cooperation between the various tribes and between tribes and the ruler were not based on an overriding loyalty, national or otherwise. To assure loyalty, the head of the chieftaincy had to provide the tribes with strategies or tools of survival other than those which the tribe might possess independently. These included protection, raiding to gain booty, and access to markets. At times, loyalty of tribes to the chief was augmented by a religious factor, as was often case with Islamically mobilized chieftaincies.[47]

By expanding his chieftaincy to include the entire Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent, and with his sons in Syria and Iraq, Husayn probably reasoned that he would be able to contain Ibn Saud and eventually destroy him.[48] This was not a recipe for co-operation, but for Hashemite rule.

Unsure of British commitments and fearful of the rise of Ibn Saud, Husayn began to engage in a kind of lexical sympathetic magic: he adjusted his

terminology to the changing reality of his strategic position. We noted previously Husayn's curious use of the terms *al-Jazirah*, *al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah*, and *Jazirat al-Arab* synonymously with *al-Bilad a-'Arabiyyah* or *Bilad al-'Arab*. In October 1916 he had declared himself *Malik al-Bilad al-'Arabiyyah*, not *Malik al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah*. In standard Arabic usage, the former terms are coterminous with the English 'Arabia' (older usage) and 'Arabian Peninsula', while the latter terms connote the meaning of 'the Arab lands' or 'land of the Arabs' – certainly quite different. What was there about the term *jazirah* that caused Husayn to use it in such an unusual fashion?

Lexically, we see that *Lisan al-'Arab* brings several uses of the term in Arabic literature; some of the definitions include Iraq by mentioning the Tigris and the Euphrates, and Syria by implication, as the Tigris goes through northern Syria.[49] Moreover, it should be remembered that Abdallah joined Rashid Rida's Society of the Arab Association while in Egypt in 1914. Rida's organization wanted to unite the independent amirs of the Arabian Peninsula in order to form a 'union between the Arabian Peninsula and the Ottoman Arab provinces' (*ittihad Jazirat al-'Arab bil-wilayat al-'Arabiyyah al-'Uthmaniyyah*). This 'Arab Empire' was to be headed by the Sharif of Mecca, as Caliph.[50] In other words, by this time the idea of *Jazirat al-'Arab* as a political unit was already in vogue, in both a wider as well as a narrower meaning. Thus the use of the term in the manner employed by Husayn was not unheard of, although it was still unusual.

Being so mortally threatened by Ibn Saud, the only other serious contender in the *Jazirah*, Husayn may have wanted to present his rule over the Peninsula as a *fait accompli* (which it was not); with this known entity as the basic political unit, all that was needed, he may have thought, was to join the other parts of the Arab world to *Jazirat al-'Arab*. It was a way of increasing his legitimacy, yet it was only wishful thinking. Granted, his reasoning may have been quite convoluted and not particularly logical, and we can never really know what Husayn thought. Nevertheless, given the various British complaints about Husayn's mental state, this might have indeed been the King's idea.

In April 1920, while in Cairo, Abdallah gave an illuminating interview to a correspondent for *The Times*. He argued for the Hijaz to lead the independent 'Jeziret-el-Arab', in which he included the Arabian Peninsula, Syria and Mesopotamia, with each entity remaining 'internally independent'. From the rest of the interview it is clear that he saw his family at the head of this entity, himself in Iraq and Faysal in Syria. He then argued against the Turkish claim to the Caliphate. There were four conditions for the Caliphate, he maintained: descent from the Quraysh; possession of the *Haramayn*; holding *Abwab [gates] al-Haramayn*, i.e. Damascus and the routes from Mesopotamia to the *Haramayn*; and the Caliph's possession of

'adequate temporal power to maintain his position'. It was the latter, he stressed, that was the most important of these conditions.[51] Here, then, was the argument for a Hashemite Caliphate, or suzerainty, with temporal as well as spiritual powers. Abdallah continued to canvass support for his father's Caliphate. During a speech in May 1923 celebrating the (conditional) British recognition of Transjordanian independence, the loyal son paid tribute to Husayn as *amir al-mu'minin*.[52]

King Husayn, frustrated by the British and seeing the fulfilment of his ambitions fade, attempted to revive them with the 'Conference of Arabia' – *Mu'tamar Jazirat al-'Arab*. First established in August 1922, the conference held its second session in Mecca in August 1923. It included 'representatives' of Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen, Hijaz and the Hadhramawt. In one of its proclamations, the 'Executive Committee' addressed all the Amirs of Arabia, calling for unity and a common political agenda. All political bodies should affiliate with the Conference. The only practical call in the proclamation was for the boycott of all British, French, and Jewish goods, and for the replacement of these with those made in the Arab countries. The Executive Committee called for a meeting in the next year – 1924 – but it never took place.[53] The whole episode appeared to be another feeble attempt by Husayn to claim some overlordship in at least the Arabic-speaking lands of Islam.

When receiving delegations from the Arab world while in Transjordan in 1924, Husayn issued a Royal Decree, demanding that the delegations should forevermore be designated 'delegations of Arabia' (*wufud al-jazirah*), instead of the 'Palestinian', 'Syrian', or any other delegation.[54]

On 3 March 1924, while Husayn was still in Transjordan, the Turks abolished the Caliphate. Four days later, Herbert Samuel, British High Commissioner in Palestine, received the following from Abdallah:

> In consequence of abolition of Caliphate by Turkish Government leaders of Moslem religious opinion have been obliged to come to a decision regarding the Caliphate. Numberless telegrams of allegiance to King Hussein as Emir el-Musninin [sic] have been received from all Arab countries, and especially from Holy Places of Mecca and Medina universally recognising him as Caliph. King Hussein has therefore accepted the position of Caliph.[55]

Husayn had finally done the deed, after years of preparation. The official announcement came from Shunah, Abdallah's winter camp:

> The step taken by the Ankara Government towards this honorable office [i.e., the Caliphate] has led the religious authorities in the *haramayn al-sharifayn* and the al-Aqsa Mosque and neighboring

> countries ... to surprise us and compel us to accept the Great Imamate (*al-imamah al-kubra*) and the Grand Caliphate (*al-Khilafah al-'uzmah*) ... Almighty God knows that our sole object is to serve Islam and my people the inhabitants of Arabia (*al-Jazirah*) in particular, and the Muslims in general.[56]

In mid-March 1924, both Husayn and Abdallah gave interviews to a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*. The King told the reporter that the Caliphate had been 'thrust upon me.' He continued:

> From everywhere they come to me and say: 'Islam must have a Khalif to protect it, and the Khalifate must not be allowed to die out. You are the only Prince competent to fill it. Your are the independent ruler of a great Moslem and Arab State. In your charge are the Holy Cities. You are of the tribe of Koreish. Your orthodoxy and zeal for the true faith are beyond all question. You are an Arab of the Arabs.'

Abdallah was more joyful:

> They [the Turks] have rendered the greatest possible service to the Arabs. I feel like sending a telegram thanking Mustafa Kemal. The Khalifate is an Arab institution. The Prophet was an Arab, the Koran is in Arabic, the Holy Places are in Arabia, and the Khalif should be an Arab of the tribe of Koreish ... Now the Khalifate has come back to Arabia.[57]

A few days after his return to the Hijaz in late March, Husayn announced the establishment of the Consultative Council. Signifying Husayn's vision of a combined spiritual and temporal Caliphate, the Council was to advise both on cultural and religious issues as well as on the exploitation of economic resources such as agriculture and industry, all with the goal of developing the Islamic world religiously and economically.[58]

The Council comprised of 31 'representatives' of the Muslim world, 'elected' by the leading *'ulama* and foreign residents of the *Haramayn*. In the various proclamations of Husayn concerning the Council, the King's terminology is instructive. Mecca was termed the *markaz*, to which various technicians and teachers charged with carrying out the mandate of the Council would be sent, at Husayn's expense. When Husayn returned to Mecca, it was reported as a return to the *markaz*.[59] The new Caliph set up the Qadi al-Qudat as the chairman of the Council, as a kind of *Shaykh al-Islam*.[60] It will be recalled that the King, in his suzerainty plan, envisaged Mecca as being the *markaz* of his polity. Now, such language, so far from reality, was pitifully indicative of the low point to which Husayn had fallen; it was his last gasp.

The Council reportedly met at least twelve times, on Tuesdays. It published two proclamations, neither of which contained anything more earthshaking than a call to Muslims to observe the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and to condemn the Kemalists.[61]

Husayn's ambitions to be recognized as Caliph finally ended with the Pilgrimage Congress of July 1924. Most of the delegates were Hijazis. Its charter praised the Arabs and their primacy in Islam, stressed that Muslims from all quarters should gather and understand each other, and called for better education in technical and religious matters.[62] It was striking that it lacked any reference to the Caliphate. Apparently, a strong bloc of participants resisted Husayn's efforts to have it recognize him as Caliph. British representative Reader Bullard observed that 'the jejune nature of the results of the Pilgrimage Conference suggest complete failure.'[63] Two months later, the eastern gateway to the Hijaz, Ta'if, fell to the Wahhabis.

At the end of the Revolt in the Hijaz, Husayn had had high expectations. The British were to give him Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula; they would force Ibn Saud to submit to him, and they would support his Caliphate ambitions. But the Hashemite monarch was to be disappointed. The British had obligations to the French and imperial designs in Iraq that took precedence over any perceived commitments to Husayn. His economic and pilgrimage policies in the Hijaz were a disaster, and Husayn had little if any support.

Faced with this situation, Husayn tried to develop a 'suzerainty' policy which the British would accept: he would be the powerful suzerain of '*Jazirat al-'Arab*', with limited autonomy for the components of the polity. This was, in essence, an expanded tribal chieftaincy.

Husayn had started his career with great hopes, which the British had augmented. He had done his best to further his personal designs and what he believed would be good for the Arabs, but he was outmanoeuvred. His suzerainty plan was rejected and his Caliphate accepted by few. The Sharif of Mecca was abandoned by his British supporters and ejected from the Hijaz by Ibn Saud; he spent most of his remaining years in the distinctly non-Arab exile of Cyprus, and died in Amman in 1931, his Hashemite vision of the post-Ottoman order unfulfilled.

NOTES

I wish to thank Joseph Kostiner for his usual sage advice concerning this article. I bear responsibility, however, for all errors.

1. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Revolt in Arabia* (New York: Putnam, 1917), pp.34–5.
2. Richard Mortel, 'Zaydi Shi'ism and the Hasanid Sharifs of Mecca', *IJMES* 9 (1978), pp.461–2. The other two historians were Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn 'Ali al-Maqrizi (d. 1442), and Jamal al-Din Abu al-Mahasin Yusuf ibn Taghribirdi (d. 1470). Al-Fasi's singling out of Abu Numayy was most probably due to his reigning during the time of the destruction of the 'Abbasid Caliphate by the Mongols in 1258; Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century* (Leyden: Brill, 1931), pp.183–4, also notes that the Sharifs of Mecca were at one time Zaydi Shiis.
3. FO 78/1389, J.H. Skene (Aleppo) to Earl of Malmesbury, No.33, 7 Aug. 1858, enclosing copy Skene to Charles Alison, No.20, 31 July 1858.
4. FO 78/1514, 12 Dec. 1860, cited in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, Vol X, Part II, The Last Years of Peace* (London: HMSO, 1938), p.824. The editors note that there 'is no real evidence of Arab support for the idea'.
5. Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.10–22. Sabunji was a former Syrian Catholic priest turned journalist from Diyarbekir who settled for several years in England; Birdwood was an Indian civil servant; Blunt was a Victorian poet and politician; Zohrab was British consul, Jeddah, from October 1878 to July 1881.
6. Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview, 1987), pp.52–4.
7. Sylvia G. Haim, 'Blunt and al-Kawakibi', *OM* 35 (1955), p.136, n.2.
8. Quoted in Sylvia G. Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p.28.
9. It has been shown that Kawakabi borrowed his ideas from Blunt (Haim, 'Blunt and al-Kawakibi'); Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), pp.107–14; Eliezer Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movement* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p.31.
10. Eliezer Tauber, 'Three Approaches, One Idea: Religion and State in the Thought of 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Najib 'Azuri and Rashid Rida,' *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 21 (1994), pp.190–8.
11. Tauber, 'Three Approaches'; Eliezer Tauber, 'Rashid Rida's Political Attitudes During World War I', *MW* 85 (1995), pp.107–21; Tauber, *Emergence*, pp.109–17.
12. While the idea was the subject of discussion, it is not my intention to suggest that it was widely accepted; the popularity of the notion among wide circles of people would be quite difficult to assess given the nature of our sources.
13. Quoted in Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, p.20. Given al-Afghani's poor reputation for telling the truth, one should take his statement with a grain of salt, although it is not unlikely.
14. FO 195/1251, Zohrab (Jeddah) to Marquis of Salisbury, No.34, 6 Aug. 1879 (quoted); FO 78/3314, Zohrab (Jeddah), 8 Feb. 1881, quoted in Kramer, op. cit., p.15.
15. Quoted in Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T.E. Lawrence* (New York: Anthenum, 1989), p.946.
16. Haim, 'Blunt and al-Kawakibi'.
17. See C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism* (Urbana:University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp.69–86.
18. Yisrael Gershoni, 'Ha-Lem Ha'Aravi, Beyt Hashim ve-Suriya ha-Gedola bi-Khtavav shel 'Abdallah, Helek Rishon', *Hamizrah Hehadash* 25 (1975), pp.1–26.
19. Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp.48-54; the Kitchener quote is on p.52. The quote on Kitchener's long held favouring of an Arab Caliphate is taken from Jukka Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920* (London: Athlone, 1969), p.18; on Kitchener and the Caliphate see Sir George Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener* (New York: Macmillan, 1920), Vol.3, pp.53–4. Kedourie and Dawn have debated Husayn's Caliphate aspirations in the pages of *IJMES* (9 [1978], pp.120–30; 10 [1979], pp.420–6). Kedourie

argues that Husayn was primarily interested in the Caliphate after the Kitchener message. Dawn says that the Caliphate 'was of interest to Husayn primarily as an instrument in his efforts with the British to gain kingship for himself and as much territory as possible for himself and the Arabs' (p.423). But Dawn does not deny that Husayn was interested in the Caliphate, only that it was a primary motivating factor. For this article's purposes, that he was interested in the Caliphate at all shows just how grand his ambitions were.

20. L/P&S/18/B22, 'Shorthand Note taken by Messenger [Ali Asghar] of a discourse by the Sherif of Mecca', undated [first week of Dec. 1914]. This paper is also in WP, 134/8/114–116, where it is dated 9 Dec. 1914.
21. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p.52; George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939), p.414 (letter of 14 July 1915).
22. Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, pp.52–4; Thomas Arnold, *The Caliphate* (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1965) pp.146–7, 170–71, 189–200. Kedourie has also shown the influence of Abbas Hilmi, Storrs, Wingate, and Clayton in lobbying for a Sharifian Caliphate, although most of this effort came after the initial Kitchener communications; see Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 1914-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp.7–64. Wingate was particularly active, writing to several movers and shakers in London in the spring and summer of 1915 and enclosing a memorandum from the Grand Qadi of the Sudan, Sir Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani, who also favoured a Sharifian Caliphate. In a letter dated 17 Nov. 1915 Mirghani wrote the Sharif, presumably with Wingate's authority, urging him to 'rise and take over the reins of the holy Arabian Koreishite Khaliphate, which you represent, being a direct descendant of our Holy Prophet' (Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab*, pp.42–3).
23. Indeed, Husayn's newspaper *al-Qiblah* was later to take issue with the notion of a separation between the spiritual and temporal function of the Caliph; Islam, wrote *al-Qiblah*, does not recognize a spiritual Caliphate akin to the Papacy (*al-Qiblah*, 21 Shawwal 1335 [9 Aug. 1917]).
24. The letter's authenticity is disputed in Anis Sayigh, *Al-Hashimiyyun wa-al Thawrah al-'Arabiyyah al-Kubra* (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1966), pp.22–4, but Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, p.11, believes the letter to be authentic. The text of the letter is in Sulayman Musa, *al-Haraka al-'Arabiyyah* (Beirut: al-Nahar, 1982), p.57.
25. Tauber, *Emergence*, pp.49–50.
26. Eliezer Tauber, *The Arab Movements in World War I* (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1993), pp.57–82.
27. F0 371/2767/30674, McMahon to Grey, No.26, 7 Feb. 1916, enclosing Hussein to Sayyid Ali El Morghani, 28 Dec. 1915, cited in Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab*, pp.122–3.
28. FO 371/2767/45855, McMahon to FO, No. 42, 29 Feb. 1916, enclosing note on the verbal messages from 'Abdallah, and FO 141/461/1198/48, Memorandum of R. Storrs, 11 March 1916, both cited and discussed in Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab*, p.123.
29. FO 882/5, Storrs' diary of visit to Jeddah, 17 October 1916; Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab*, pp.144–5. Dawn's contention (*IJMES* 10 [1979] p.424) that the title claimed by Husayn, *amir al-mu'minin*, 'had long since lost its connection with the caliph and had become a rarely used title of honor' conflicts with that of Gibb: 'until the end of the Caliphate as an institution, *amir al-mu'minin* was employed exclusively as the protocollary title of a caliph, and among the Sunnis its adoption by a ruler implied a claim to the office of caliph' (H.A.R. Gibb, '*Amir al-Mu'minin*,' *EI*²).
30. FO 371/3054/228069, Wingate to FO, No. 1286, 29 Nov. 1917.
31. FO 686/14, Cornwallis to Clayton, 9 Dec. 1917; *Arab Bulletin*, No. 76, 13 Jan. 1918.
32. FO 883/13, Director, Arab Bureau, to High Commissioner, 3 Jan. 1918.
33. Jeffery Rudd, 'Abdullah bin al-Husayn: The Making of an Arab Political Leader', unpublished PhD dissertation, SOAS, 1993, p.146.
34. FO 371/3383/25577, D[avid] G[eorge] H[ogarth], 'REPORT ON MISSION TO JEDDAH,' 15 January 1918, and Hussein to High Commissioner, 31 Dec. 1917, both enclosed in Wingate to Balfour, No. 15, 27 Jan. 1918; Rudd (note 33), pp.146–7.
35. *AB*, No. 77, 27 Jan. 1918.
36. Daniel Silverfarb, 'The British Government and the Khurmah Dispute, 1918–1919', *Arabian Studies* 5 (1979), pp.37–60. For more on the British view of Husayn as *primus inter pares*,

see *AB*, No.77 27 Jan. 1918. It should not be forgotten that these officials developed the suzerainty idea also as a way to protect Husayn from Ibn Saud.

37. FO 371/3407/70822, ACCOUNT OF A MEETING HELD AT THE RESIDENCY AT 6 p.m. ON MARCH 23rd 1918.
38. FO 882/3, Clayton to Wilson, 6 May 1918, cited in Ronald Colman, 'Revolt in Arabia, 1916-1919: Conflict and Coalition in a Tribal Political System,' unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia, 1976, p.252.
39. Colman, pp.252–8.
40. FO 686/38, NOTES OF CONVERSATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 31st MAY, 1st AND 2nd JUNE, enclosed in Wilson to Wingate, 5 June 1918.
41. FO 686/38, NOTES OF CONVERSATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 31st MAY, 1st AND 2nd JUNE, enclosed in Wilson to Wingate, 5 June 1918. It is perhaps ironic that just a few month later, the *AB* serialized a translation of Alfonso Nallino's 'Appunti sulla natura del 'Califfato' in genere e sul persunto "Califfato Ottomano"', where Nallino attacks just such European misconceptions of the Caliphate. See *AB*, No.101, 27 Aug.; No.102, 3 Sept.; and No.104, 24 Sept. 1918.
42. FO 882/12, Fuad el-Khatib to Col. Wilson, 20 April 1917. This love, as far as it existed, was not to last for long.
43. FO 686/9, Wilson, 19 July 1918, INTERVIEW WITH KING HUSSEIN AT BRITISH AGENCY, JEDDAH on 18th July, 1918. On Husayn's unusual use of the term *Jazirat al-'Arab*, see below.
44. FO 686/40, Husayn to Wilson, 21 Nov. 1918, enclosures No.1 and No.2 in Wilson to Wingate, 24 Nov. 1918.
45. Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.3–4. See also Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.1–99.
46. Kostiner, *The Making*, p.4.
47. See also Ronald Cohen, 'Introduction', in Ronald Cohen and Elman Service (eds.), *Origins of the State* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1978), pp.1–17; Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, 'Introduction: Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation in the Middle East,' in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp.1–24; Gellner, *Muslim Society*. Both Gellner and Kostiner are beholden in much of their analysis to Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Vol.2.
48. See Colman, p.297.
49. Muhammad ibn al-Mukarram ibn Manzur, *Lisan al-'Arab*,Vol. 1, (first edition, Cairo, 1883-1890, edition used is published by Dar al-Ma'arif, n.p., n.d.) pp.613–14. Among the Indian Khilafatists, the term seems to have been first used in January 1920, in a petition drawn up by Muhammad Ali for presentation to the viceroy. They stressed that the Caliph had to maintain his temporal authority over the '*jazirat al-arab* ... which includes all Arab lands' (Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1982] p.86). In a later period, there were two newspapers called *Jazirat al-'Arab* and *al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah*. The former was a weekly published in Amman in 1927, while the latter was a daily and then a weekly which moved from Damascus to Amman in 1939, and appeared until the mid-1950s (Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1995], p.102); they did not deal solely with affairs in the Arabian Peninsula.
50. *Al-Manar*, 28 June 1919, p.203; Tauber, *Emergence*, pp.114–15.
51. FO 371/5187/E 3996, clipping from *The Times*, undated, but datelined Cairo, 28 April 1920.
52. *Al-Qiblah*, No. 695, 14 June 1923.
53. On the 'Conference of Arabia' see the following: MAE, Le Caire (Ambassade), carton No. 131, informer (signature illegible) to Henri Gaillard (Cairo), in English, 27 Oct. 1923; *Al-Qiblah*, No.708, 5 Aug.1923; No.737, 10 Nov. 1923; FO 686/28, JEDDAH REPORT, 28 Sept. to 31 Oct. 1923; *OM* 2 (1922), pp.291–2; *OM* 3 (1923), pp.447–51. See also Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, p.82.

54. *Al-Qiblah*, No. 757, 24 Jan. 1924. See also *al-Qiblah*, No.443, 23 Dec. 1920, which notes that Husayn's Revolt was not the '*al-nahda al-Hijaziyyah*', but rather the '*al-nahda al-'Arabiyyah*'; its goal was to join the Arabs in 'an independent Arab community in Arabia' (*jam'iyah 'Arabiyyah mustaqillah fi al-Jazirah*). It is clear from the article that Syria and Iraq – 'whose borders are well known'– are included in the '*Jazirah*.'
55. FO 371/10217/E 2187, High Commissioner for Palestine to Secretary of State for the Colonies, No.86, 7 March 1924.
56. Husayn's Caliphate Proclamation, 11 March 1924, in 'Abdallah ibn Husayn, *Mudhakkirati* (Jerusalem: n.p., 1945), pp.197–200; see also FO 371/10212/E 2608, Fuad El Khatib, Foreign Minister Hashemite Arabic Government (Shunneh, Amman) to FO, 13 March 1924.
57. FO 371/10217/E 2286, clipping from the *Manchester Guardian*, 13 March 1924.
58. *Al-Qiblah*, No.776, 31 March 1924.
59. *Al-Qiblah*, No.776, 31 March; No. 777, 3 April 1924.
60. *Al-Qiblah*, 10 April 1924.
61. *Al-Qiblah*, No.797, 19 June; FO 686/29, JEDDAH REPORT, 30 May to 28 June 1924.
62. The charter is in *Al-Qiblah*, 7 July 1924, and is translated in full in Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, pp.181–2.
63. Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, pp.84-84; FO 371/10006E 7084, Jeddah Report, 29 June to 30 July 1924; FO 686/29, JEDDAH REPORT, 31 July to 30 Aug. 1924.